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ABSTRACT
Search and Offshoring in the Presence of “Animal Spirits”
In this paper, we introduce two sources of unemployment in a two-factor general equilibrium
model: search frictions and fairness considerations. We find that a binding fair-wage
constraint increases the unskilled unemployment rate and can at the same time lead to a
higher unemployment rate for skilled workers, as compared to an equilibrium where fairness
considerations are absent or non-binding. Starting from a constrained equilibrium, an
increase in the fairness parameter leads to increases in both skilled and unskilled
unemployment. The wage of unskilled workers increases but the wage of skilled workers
decreases. Next we allow for offshoring of unskilled jobs in our model, and we find that, as a
result, it becomes more likely that the fair-wage constraint binds. Offshoring of unskilled jobs
always leads to an increase in skilled wage, a decrease in skilled unemployment and an
increase in unskilled unemployment. The presence of fairness considerations increases the
adverse impact of offshoring on unskilled unemployment. The unskilled wage can increase or
decrease as a result of offshoring.

JEL Classification:
Keywords:

E24, F16, F41

fair wages, unemployment, strategic effect, offshoring

Corresponding author:
Devashish Mitra
Department of Economics
The Maxwell School
Syracuse University
110 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244
USA
E-mail: dmitra@maxwell.syr.edu

1

Introduction

Akerlof and Shiller (2009) in their recent book explain the importance of paying attention to
“animal spirits” in understanding how economies behave. By “animal spirits,” they mean “the
thought patterns that animate people’s ideas and feelings.” Akerlof and Shiller look at various
aspects of animal spirits that impact economic decision making. According to them, fairness is
one such aspect (other aspects are confidence, corruption and antisocial behavior, money illusion
etc.) and is the aspect of “animal spirits” that can lead to unemployment. They discuss in detail
how our sense of fairness results, up to a limit, in a positive relationship between the eﬀort we, as
workers, put in and the wage we receive relative to what we believe is “fair,” and how in turn, that
can result in the employer setting a wage above what clears the market. Obviously, this results in
unemployment. There is now a whole strand in the unemployment literature, following Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), that focuses on such fairness or fair-wage considerations. It is, however, important to
point out that in addition to fair-wage models, macroeconomists use a wide variety of other models
to explain the existence of unemployment. Prominent among them are minimum-wage models,
insider-outsider labor union models, models based on implicit contracts, search-unemployment
models and eﬃciency wages.1
In a fair-wage model with skilled and unskilled workers, the fairness constraint usually binds for
unskilled workers and is never binding for skilled workers (as long as a skilled worker makes more
than an unskilled worker). Thus, the model generates zero unemployment for skilled workers and a
positive rate of unemployment for unskilled workers. While surveys of managers and workers, sociological studies of work environments, firm-level studies of pay structures, experiments, personnel
management textbooks etc. provide a wealth of evidence supporting the assumption or idea of a
fair-wage (see for instance Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bewley (2005) and Howitt (2002) for a survey
of the evidence), the prediction of a “fair-wage” model, with skilled and unskilled labor, that skilled
unemployment is zero is not very realistic. According to the OECD Employment Outlook (2007),
while the unemployment rate in the US in 2006 for people with less than secondary education was
roughly 9 percent, it was 5 percent and 2.6 percent for people with upper secondary and tertiary
education, respectively. The EU unemployment rates for the same year for the same three cate1

In fact, the fair-wage model can be viewed as a kind of eﬃciency wage model.
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gories were 13, 7 and 4 percent respectively. Thus, in addition to unskilled unemployment, skilled
unemployment can be quite substantial.
In order to generate positive unemployment rates for both categories of workers and at the
same time take the strong evidence in favor of the fair-wage hypothesis seriously, we incorporate
this hypothesis into a search model of unemployment.2 Another reason for combining the two
diﬀerent strands of the unemployment literature is Solow’s (1980) insight that unemployment in
the real world is caused by diﬀerent sources. Moreover, we show that the two alternative sources
of unemployment we focus on, namely search frictions and the fair-wage constraint do not lead
to additively separable eﬀects but actually interact with each other in important and interesting
ways to produce outcomes when the economy is hit by diﬀerent shocks. To illustrate this point,
we perform comparative statics with respect to the fairness parameter (that measures the society’s
preference for fairness) and the economy’s stock of skilled labor, and look at the impact of oﬀshoring.
By combining search frictions with fair-wage concerns, we obtain several new results. One of
the results, which we find quite interesting, is that introducing fairness considerations in a search
model leads not only to an increase in the unemployment of unskilled workers, a group for whom
the fair-wage constraint is binding, but can also possibly lead to an increase in the unemployment of
skilled workers, a group for whom the fair-wage constraint is not binding. The intuition here can be
explained as follows. Introducing fairness considerations (or increasing the preference for fairness)
resulting in a binding fair-wage constraint makes it more expensive to hire unskilled workers, and
therefore, less jobs are created for unskilled workers leading to increased unemployment of unskilled
workers. Since the number of unskilled workers employed is now lower, given the complementarity
between the two types of workers in production, we get a reduction in the marginal product of skilled
workers. This reduces the demand for skilled workers as well, unless it is oﬀset by the “strategic
eﬀect” (explained below) which causes increased hiring of skilled workers. Hence, their market
tightness and wage rate may go down and we then also get an increase in their unemployment.
2

There is a very well-developed literature in macroeconomics on the search theory of unemployment. See Pissarides

(2000) for an excellent and comprehensive treatment. In addition to the vast macroeconomic literature on search
unemployment in a closed economy, it is important to note that there also exists a literature on search induced
unemployment in an open economy (e.g. Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999), Davidson and Matusz (2004), Moore
and Ranjan (2005), Helpman and Itskhoki (2007)).
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Introducing a fairness (“fair-wage”) constraint results in a net “strategic eﬀect” in the wage
and employment decision of firms, identified by Stole and Zweibel (1996), even if it is absent in
net terms in the unconstrained model. The “strategic eﬀect” in our set up can be explained as
follows. In search models, wage is positively related to the market tightness, which also implies that
the labor cost (wage plus recruitment cost) is positively related to market tightness. Therefore,
the fairness constraint is likely to bind when the ratio of market tightness for skilled to unskilled
labor is high. A firm correctly anticipating a binding fair-wage constraint has an incentive to
increase the relative employment of skilled workers to reduce their marginal product to, in turn,
reduce the wage obtained through wage bargaining. Therefore, this “strategic eﬀect” causes the
employment of skilled workers (relative to unskilled) to be higher than it would be in its absence.
In the unconstrained case (where there is no fairness constraint or the constraint does not bind),
the "strategic eﬀects" of the relative employment of skilled labor on skilled and unskilled wage rates
are in opposite directions and cancel each other out in the determination of the wage bill. In the
constrained case, there is always a non-zero net "strategic eﬀect" unless the production function is
such that the marginal product of skilled workers is independent of the number of skilled workers
employed (as in the case of Leontief production function).
When the “strategic eﬀect” is weak or absent, a binding fairness constraint leads to an increase in
skilled unemployment, along with the increase in unskilled unemployment. For a marginal increase
in the degree of fairness (when the “fair-wage” constraint is binding), the “strategic eﬀect” is of
the second order, and hence, there is always an increase in the skilled unemployment as well. Since
the unemployment rate and wage of skilled workers move in opposite directions, the skilled wage
decreases, however, the unskilled wage increases due to increased concern for fairness. What this
implies is that when we compare two countries with diﬀerent degrees of concern for fairness, we
expect the country with a greater concern for fairness not only to have a higher unemployment for
unskilled workers, but also to have a higher unemployment for skilled workers.
The unemployment figures we provided earlier show that unemployment rates are higher for
Europe relative to the US for all educational attainment categories of workers. This is consistent
with our model’s prediction that an increase in the fairness parameter leads to higher unemployment
for both types of workers since, based on survey evidence of attitudes to poverty and income, one can
argue that social norms of fairness are stronger in Europe than in the US. According to calculations
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by Alesina and Glaeser (2005), based on data from the World Values Survey for the years 1983-97,
while only 29 percent of the responders from the US believe that the poor are trapped in poverty,
about 60 percent of the European responders believe this to be the case. Furthermore, only 30
percent in the US believe that luck determines income, while 54 percent in the EU believe in luck
being a determinant. Alesina and Glaeser also find that 60 percent of the Americans surveyed
believe that the poor are lazy, while only 26 percent of the EU nationals surveyed believe so.3
Finally, using the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) surveys of public opinion, Osberg
and Smeeding (2006) find in the case of the US “less concern for leveling up at the bottom of the
distribution than in other nations.” That is, there is less concern for raising the income of the poor
relative to the mean income in the US than in other countries.
Next, we find that introducing fairness considerations in a search model of unemployment also
leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria. As discussed earlier, the fair-wage constraint binds if
the market for skilled labor is tight relative to the market for unskilled labor. If firms expect the
ratio of market tightness of skilled to unskilled to be high and therefore the fair-wage constraint to
bind, they will end up hiring more skilled workers relative to unskilled workers due to the “strategic
eﬀect” discussed earlier. This, in turn, will make the relative market tightness for skilled workers
higher creating a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” We find that the possibility of multiple equilibria exists
for intermediate levels skilled-to-unskilled labor endowment ratios. Thus, the implication here is
that, in this intermediate range of skill abundance, countries with identical preference for fairness
and with identical relative factor endowments can have diﬀerent wages and unemployment rates.
Looking at the impact of a reduction in skill endowment on unemployment, we find that the
presence of a fair-wage constraint (in addition to search) amplifies the adverse eﬀect on unskilled
unemployment. That is, the increase in unskilled unemployment is larger as a consequence of a
decrease in skill endowment when the fair-wage constraint is binding. Therefore, the fair-wage
constraint makes the impact of a decrease in skill endowment on unskilled unemployment worse.
3

Alesina and Angeletos (2005) point to the fact that while the pre-tax inequality is much higher in the US than

in Europe (Gini coeﬃcient of 38.5 as opposed to 29.1), the redistributive policies are much more extensive and
the tax structure much more progressive in the latter. They argue that "the diﬀerence in political support for
redistribution appears, rather, to reflect a diﬀerence in social perceptions regarding the fairness of market outcomes
and the underlying sources of income inequality."
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Finally, we look at the impact of oﬀshoring on unemployment and wages in the presence of
fairness considerations and search frictions. Both in the presence and absence of fairness considerations (with search frictions present in both cases), oﬀshoring of unskilled jobs increases skilled wage,
reduces skilled unemployment and increases unskilled unemployment. The reason is that the input
produced by foreign labor in the model is a substitute for domestic unskilled labor, and through
this competitive eﬀect, oﬀshoring reduces the tightness in the unskilled labor market. Thus, the
cost of hiring domestic unskilled labor also goes down. Due to the complementarity between skilled
labor and the production input of domestic unskilled labor (or that produced by foreign labor),
we get an increase in the demand for skilled labor and increase in skilled-labor market tightness.
The presence of fairness considerations makes the impact of this kind of oﬀshoring on unskilled
unemployment worse because in addition to the reduced market tightness in the unskilled labor
market coming from the direct competitive pressure from the substitutable input produced by
foreign labor, there is an indirect upward pressure on unskilled wages coming from the fact that
oﬀshoring can convert a non-binding fairness constraint into a binding one. This can make the
impact of oﬀshoring on the unskilled wage ambiguous. In fact, if the fair-wage constraint is binding
before and after oﬀshoring, contrary to general perceptions, we will get an increase in the unskilled
wage as a result of oﬀshoring (as skilled and unskilled wage will be moving in the same direction).
Finally, the fair-wage constraint also aﬀects the amount of oﬀshoring in equilibrium. We get more
oﬀshoring in the presence of fair-wage considerations. Also, the extent of oﬀshoring increases as
the society’s preference for fairness increases.
Looking at related literature, Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) extend the Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) model to a two-sector setting to study the impact of international trade and technology
shocks on unemployment and relative wages.4 They show that trade between US and Europe, with
the preference for fairness being greater in the latter, leads to reduction in wage inequality and
increase in unemployment in the US and increase in wage inequality and reduction in unemployment
in Europe. They also analyze how trade with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) aﬀects
wage inequality and unemployment diﬀerently in these two regions.
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) (in subsection 2.6 of Chapter 10 of their book) compare the
Anglo-Saxon labor market with the European labor market. While search frictions with skilled and
4

See also Agell and Lundborg (1995).
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unskilled workers are incorporated in both these types of markets, the European labor market also
has an endogenous minimum wage for unskilled workers that is proportional to the skilled wage,
i.e., notions of fairness and equality are incorporated into the determination of the minimum wage.
This is very similar to the concept of the fair wage that we use in this paper. However, the focus of
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) is limited to a comparison of the eﬀects of skill-biased technological
change on the two types of labor in the two labor markets. They assume that each type of labor
specifically produces exclusively a particular intermediate good in an industry devoted to such
production, and then there is a final good industry where the two intermediate goods are combined
to produce the final good. By separating the two types of workers to work in diﬀerent firms in
diﬀerent sectors, Cahuc and Zylberberg abstract from what we call in our paper “strategic eﬀect”
and as a result do not have the "multiple-equilibria" case that we find. As well, the vast empirical
literature on the fair-wage hypothesis suggests that while the notion of "fair wage" can be based
on wage comparisons across occupations and skill types, it is hardly ever based on comparisons
across sectors. To keep the comparison between skilled and unskilled wages in the same industry to
arrive at the “fair wage”, both types of workers in our model are employed in the same firm. This
feature gives rise to the cross-factor “strategic eﬀect” (in addition to the own “strategic eﬀect”)
in our model, which means that not only can the employment level of one type of workers aﬀect
the negotiated wage of that worker type, it can also aﬀect the negotiated wage of the other kind
of workers. This is taken into account in both the firm’s maximization problem and the wage
negotiation process. In addition, the employment of both types of workers by the firms allows us to
study the implications of oﬀshoring of the job done by one type of workers. Cahuc and Zylberberg
do not look at oﬀshoring to which we devote a substantial part of our paper. Finally, we perform
several diﬀerent types of comparative static exercises, including analysis of shocks that move us
from a situation of nonbinding to binding "fair-wage" constraint.
Another recent related paper is Grossman and Helpman (2008). In that paper, the utility
derived by a worker is increasing in her own wage but decreasing in the average wage of the firm.
This utility has to be above a threshold for the participation constraint of the worker to be satisfied.
Thus, under certain conditions, Grossman and Helpman are able to get an equilibrium where in
some firms, a large number of unskilled workers (relative to the number of skilled workers) work at
a very low wage (firm-level average wage is low) and in others, a small number of unskilled workers
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work at very high wages (firm-level average wage is high). Since the eﬀect of own wage and average
firm wage are in opposite directions in the worker’s utility function, the two types of firms result in
the same level of worker utility. There is no unemployment in the Grossman-Helpman model since
workers can be employed at very low wages as long as the average wage in the firm is low. In order
to get rid of ineﬃciencies caused by jealousies or fairness considerations, firms oﬀshore the work
of unskilled workers in their model. The assumption driving this result is that for a multinational
firm, only the average firm wage for operations carried out within the domestic boundaries of a
country enters the domestic worker’s utility function. Again, there is no unemployment of any kind
in this case. A result in the Grossman-Helpman paper that is similar to ours is the direct positive
relationship between the strength of the preference for fair wages and the extent of oﬀshoring, even
though the motivation for oﬀshoring in our model is very diﬀerent from theirs.
Before ending the introduction, we would like to reiterate and substantiate our earlier claim that
the eﬀects of shocks on wages and unemployment rates in our model are not additively separable into
eﬀects that one would see in a pure fair-wage model and a pure search model.5 By incorporating
search frictions in a fair-wage model of unemployment, not only do we trivially generate skilled
unemployment, but more substantively, identify another margin of adjustment to shocks in the
form skilled unemployment or market tightness for skilled workers. In a pure fair wage model,
the margins of adjustment are skilled wage and unskilled unemployment, therefore, the impact of
shocks on unskilled unemployment may be exaggerated and the impact on skilled unemployment
understated. For example, starting from an equilibrium where the fairness constraint binds, an
increase in the preference for fairness has no impact on the skilled unemployment in the pure fairwage model, but skilled unemployment increases unambiguously in the hybrid (fair wage plus search
frictions) model. Looking at the oﬀshoring of jobs done by unskilled labor, we find that oﬀshoring
can lead to complete unemployment of unskilled workers in a pure fair-wage model because skilled
wage rises and consequently fair wage rises to a level that makes it unprofitable for firms to employ
unskilled workers. However, in our hybrid model, skilled wage does not rise as much because a
part of adjustment takes place through a tightening of skilled labor market, resulting in lower
skilled unemployment. Thus, the increase in skilled wage, and hence, in the fair wage is less, which
5

While the pure fair-wage model is worked out in the appendix, the unconstrained case in the main text is nothing

but a pure search model.
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alleviates the impact of oﬀshoring on unskilled unemployment.

2
2.1

The Model
The Goods Market

The economy comprises three types of agents: S skilled workers, L unskilled workers, and a large
number of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have access to technology to produce a final good, Z,
using skilled and unskilled labor. The production function for the final good Z, which is constant
returns to scale, is given by
Z = F (εs s, εl l)

(1)

where s and l, respectively, are the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers employed, and εs and εl
are the eﬀorts undertaken by the two types of workers which depend on the fairness considerations
as discussed below. We also assume that the final good, Z, is the numeraire.

2.2

The Labor Market

Our description of labor market is a combination of a static version of Pissarides (2000) (along the
lines of Helpman and Itskhoki (2007)) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Entrepreneurs must post
vacancies to hire skilled and unskilled workers to undertake production. Once a vacancy is matched
with a worker, she is hired to work for that firm (entrepreneur). Each worker has one unit of labor
to devote to market activities, however, workers choose their eﬀort at work, ε, where ε ∈ (0, 1].
Following Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) we postulate the following instantaneous utility function
for a worker of type-i:
G(Ci , εi ) = g(Ci ) + 4εi

(2)

where Ci is the consumption of the final good by the worker of type-i and 4εi ≡ − |εi − εni | is the
degree of norm violation for a worker of type-i. The eﬀort norm of worker of type-i is determined
by
εni = min(

wi
, 1)
wi∗

(3)

where wi∗ denotes the fair wage for a worker of type-i and wi is the actual wage paid. From the
utility function in (2) it is obvious that once a worker’s wage is set, she always chooses εi = εni
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to maximize utility. Therefore, (3) above implies that workers provide the normal level of eﬀort,
which is set to 1, if they receive at least their fair wage.
The labor markets for both skilled and unskilled are characterized by a matching technology
that depends on the number of searchers (size of the labor force) and the number of job vacancies.
Pissarides (2000) describes the empirical support for a constant returns to scale matching function,
which is what we use in this paper.
Let ui denote the unemployment rate of factor i, θi the vacancy rate (i.e., the number of
vacancies divided by the labor force), S the economy’s endowment of skilled labor, and L the
endowment of unskilled labor. Since the model is static where all workers search for a job, and a
fraction 1 − ui of workers of type-i is matched, θi is also the measure of market tightness. Then,
we write the number of matches for each factor as constant-returns-to-scale functions as follows:

Define ms ≡

M(θs S,S)
S

M (θs S, S) = M (θs , 1)S

(4)

M (θl L, L) = M (θl , 1)L

(5)

M(θl L,L)
= M (θl , 1) as the matching rates for
L
i
≡ m
θi . The constant returns to matching implies

= M (θs , 1) and ml ≡

the two factors, where m0 (θi ) > 0. Define q(θi )

q 0 (θi ) < 0. With this notation, the probability of finding a job for a searcher of type- i is θi q(θi ),
and the probability of filling up a vacant job is q(θi ). The former is an increasing function of market
tightness, and the latter is a decreasing function of market tightness. The number of vacancies that
a firm needs to create for it to expect to create one job at the end of the matching process is

1
q(θi ) .

For a large firm, by the law of large numbers the actual ratio of vacancies to jobs (matches) created
will be

1
q(θi ) .

We will restrict attention to the case where skilled workers would never prefer to search for an
unskilled job, even if that were possible.6 Note once again that the model is static (one-period).
The unemployment rate for each factor is given by:
ui = 1 − mi = 1 − θi q(θi )

(6)

An entrepreneur posting vacancies must pay a recruitment cost of ci (i = s, l) units of the final
good per vacancy posted. Since a firm needs to post
6

1
q(θi )

vacancies to create one job, the vacancy

This can be done by imposing reasonable restrictions on the parameters of production and matching functions

and on the relative factor endowments of skilled and unskilled labor.
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cost per worker employed equals

ci
q(θi ) .

Once a job is filled, the entrepreneur receives the value of

the marginal product of that factor less the factoral wage, wi , where the wage is denoted in units
of the final good.
We solve the entrepreneur’s problem in two stages. In the first stage, employment and the number of vacancies are chosen, anticipating the wages as functions of skilled and unskilled employment
(determined through bargaining in the second stage) correctly. Then given the employment levels
chosen in the first stage, the wage rate is determined by a process of bargaining between the entrepreneur and the worker, along the lines of Stole and Zweibel (1996). A worker and her employer
bargain with each other taking into account the impact of the worker’s possible exit on wages of
other employees. In other words, we allow the possibility of renegotiation of the employer with
other employees if bargaining fails with any employee, and this feature is completely factored into
the bargaining process.7
The discussion above implies that our overall equilibrium concept is one of subgame perfect
equilibrium which is solved using backward induction. That is, taking as given the employment
chosen in the first stage, in the second stage the wages are determined through a process of simultaneous Stole-Zweibel bargaining between the firm and the workers. Anticipating the second stage
wage as a function of employment, the firm optimally chooses employment in the first stage.
Next, along the lines of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we show in the appendix that a firm never
pays a wage less than the fair wage, therefore, workers always work at full eﬀort, and there is no
loss of generality in assuming the production function given in (1) to be
Z = F (s, l)

(7)

With the fair-wage constraint never binding for skilled workers (as shown later), the entrepreneur
solves the following problem in the first stage correctly anticipating the wages paid in the second
stage of skilled and unskilled employment.
M axF (s, l) − ws (s, l)s − M ax{wl (s, l), wl∗ }l −
s,l

cl
cs
s−
l
q(θs )
q(θl )

(8)

Below we describe the wage determination in two cases: when the fairness constraint does not
bind and when it does bind.
7

A special case of this, where the worker and employer have equal bargaining weights, exactly boils down to the

Shapley value solution to a cooperative, multilateral bargaining problem.
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2.3

Wage Determination

2.3.1

Unconstrained case

The first-order conditions for the optimal choices of s and l are given by
∂wl
∂ws
−l
∂s
∂s
∂wl
∂ws
−l
[F2 (s, l)] − wl − s
∂l
∂l

[F1 (s, l)] − ws − s

=
=

cs
q(θs )
cl
q(θl )

(9)
(10)

where subscripts “1” and “2” denote partial derivatives of the production function with respect to
the first and second arguments, respectively. Denote the expressions on the l.h.s in the above two
equations by Ji , i = s, l, where Ji is the surplus of the firm from hiring the marginal worker of
type-i. Assuming unemployment benefit to be zero, the bargaining weight of a worker to be β, the
bargained wage for a worker of type-i is obtained as follows.
wib = arg max wi β Ji 1−β

(11)

wi

As mentioned earlier, a worker and her employer bargain with each other taking into account
the impact of the worker’s possible exit on wages of other employees. In other words, we allow
the possibility of renegotiation of the employer with other employees if bargaining fails with any
employee, and this feature is completely factored into the bargaining process. Using (9), (10), the
first-order conditions of the above maximization problem yields the following expressions for wages
for the two types of workers.
∂wl
∂ws
−l
]
∂s
∂s
∂wl
∂ws
−l
]
= β[F2 (s, l) − s
∂l
∂l

ws = β[F1 (s, l) − s

(12)

wl

(13)

The above is a system of diﬀerential equations, where each worker’s bargained wage is a fraction of
the surplus she creates in the form of her marginal product plus the reduction in the wage bill (or
minus the increase in the wage bill) of the existing workers through her employment (relative to the
situation where she exits and wages with other workers are renegotiated). As seen from the above
diﬀerential equations, there are own as well as cross eﬀects of skilled and unskilled employment on
wages.
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It is important to note here that if ws and wl are homogeneous of degree zero in s and l, the two
first-order conditions above result in the zero-profit condition for the firm being satisfied.8 Taking
this as an important hint in finding the solution to the above set of diﬀerential equations, we write ws
and wl as functions of s/l. Denote s/l by t. Given that F (s, l) is CRS, we can write F (s, l) = lF (t; 1).
Denote F (t; 1) by f (t) and it follows that F1 (s, l) = f 0 (t) and F2 (s, l) = f (t) − tf 0 (t).
In the appendix we show that the solutions to (12) and (13), namely bargained wage rates in
the second (bargaining) stage for any relative skilled employment, t set in the first (prior) stageare given by
Lemma 1: ws (t) = βf 0 (t); wl (t) = β(f (t) − tf 0 (t))
That is, the wages are simply a fraction β of the respective marginal products of labor. This is
despite the presence of the “strategic eﬀect” mentioned in the introduction which are captured by
∂ws
i
terms i ∂w
∂j , for i, j = s, l in the first-order conditions (9) and (10). For example, s ∂s captures the

eﬀect of hiring an additional skilled worker on skilled wage. If hiring an additional skilled worker
lowers their marginal product it will reduce the Nash bargained wage that firms have to pay to
skilled workers. Therefore, the value of a skilled job to the firm would exceed the marginal product
of skilled labor due to this eﬀect. However, an additional skilled worker also increases the marginal
l
product of unskilled workers which would lead to an increase in the unskilled wage ( ∂w
∂s > 0),

leading to a reduced value of a skilled job for the firm. For a constant returns to scale production
function, these two “strategic eﬀects” cancel out in the determination of the wage bill. Thus, the
surplus that is shared between the worker and the firm is the worker’s marginal product and it is
shared according to their bargaining weights.
2.3.2

Constrained Case

Suppose the fair wage is wl∗ , and the firm expects it to be the unskilled wage in the second stage.
Assuming that wl∗ , determined in general equilibrium, is taken by the firm parametrically (as given),
the first-order conditions for the employment choice in the first stage become
8

Multiplying (9) by s and (10) by l and adding we get F (s, l) = (ws +

cs
qs (θs ) )s + (wl

+

cl
∂ws
ql (θl ) )l + s(s ∂s

s
+ l ∂w
∂l ) +

∂wl
∂wl
∂wl
∂ws
∂ws
l
l(l ∂w
∂l + s ∂s ). Therefore, the zero profit condition holds if s ∂s + l ∂l = l ∂l + s ∂s = 0, which always holds if if

ws and wl are homogeneous of degree zero in s and l.
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∂ws
∂s
∂w
s
f (t) − tf 0 (t) − wl∗ − s
∂l
f 0 (t) − ws − s

=
=

cs
q(θs )
cl
q(θl )

(14)
(15)

The value of an extra skilled worker for a firm is given by the l.h.s of (14). As in the unconstrained
case, if ws is homogeneous of degree zero in s and l, the two first-order conditions above result in
the zero-profit condition for the firm being satisfied. We thus write ws as a function of t = s/l.
Using Nash bargaining, as in the unconstrained case, the wage of a skilled worker is given by the
following diﬀerential equation
ws (t) = β[f 0 (t) − tws0 (t)]

(16)

The solution to the above diﬀerential equation is given by
− β1

ws (t) = t

Zt

x

1−β
β

f 0 (x)dx

(17)

0

In the case of Cobb-Douglas production function given by
F =

sγ l1−γ
γ γ (1 − γ)1−γ

(18)

the skilled wage given in (17) takes the following simple form
ws (t) = φβf 0 (t)
where φ ≡

1
1−(1−γ)β .

(19)

Since φ > 1, it implies that the skilled wage is a greater fraction of the

marginal product of skilled workers in the constrained case than in the unconstrained case. This
happens because of the “strategic eﬀect” mentioned earlier. Since the fair wage of unskilled workers
is determined outside the firm, an additional skilled worker does not increase the wage of unskilled
workers giving rise only to the positive “strategic eﬀect” of reducing the wage for all employed
skilled workers in the firm. Therefore, the value of a skilled job exceeds the marginal product of
skilled labor, which is reflected in the skilled wage being a higher fraction of marginal product of
skilled labor in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function. For analytical tractability and to
obtain closed form solutions, in rest of the paper we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: The production function for the final good is of the Cobb-Douglas form given
in (18) and hence f (t) =

tγ
γ γ (1−γ)1−γ .
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Having determined wages in the constrained and unconstrained cases, we next solve for the
equilibria in the two cases.

3

Autarky Equilibrium

3.1

Unconstrained case

It is shown in the appendix that the first-order conditions (9), (10), and lemma 1 imply
Lemma 2: ws (t) = βf 0 (t) =

β
cs
1−β q(θs ) ; wl (t)

= β(f (t) − tf 0 (t)) =

β
cl
1−β q(θl ) .

The above relationships are determined by the fact that the surplus from a job-i in equilibrium
equals the hiring cost of

ci
q(θi ) .

Since the firms take θi as given, lemma 2 provides us with two

expressions for the relative demand td for a firm, both of which must be true in equilibrium.
Dividing one expression by the other we get the following expression for the relative demand td as
a function of θs and θl .

f 0 (td )
cs q(θl )
=
d
d
0
d
f (t ) − t f (t )
cl q(θs )

Using the functional form for f (t) given in Assumption 1, the above can be written as
γ
t =
1−γ
d

µ

cl q(θs )
cs q(θl )

¶

(20)

To obtain closed form solutions, we assume that the matching function is also of Cobb-Douglas
form given as follows.
Assumption 2: m(θi ) = k(θi )δ and hence q(θi ) = k(θi )δ−1 .
Under the above assumption, the relative demand is decreasing in

θs
θl .

This is shown using a

downward sloping curve denoted by RLDu in Figure 1 in ( sl , θθsl ) space. This is intuitive as the
relative cost of employing skilled labor (relative to unskilled) is increasing in its relative market
tightness.
Having obtained an expression for relative demand, next we derive an expression for the relative
supply of two types of labor. Denoting the economy’s endowments of skilled and unskilled labor
by S and L respectively, the relative supply (available for employment) is given by
using (6) becomes
S
Sθs q(θs )
=
t =
Lθl q(θl )
L
s
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µ

θs
θl

¶δ

S(1−us )
L(1−ul ) ,

which

(21)

where the last equality follows from the functional form for the matching function given in Assumption 2. The above is clearly increasing in

θs
θl .

In other words, because the relative employment

rate is increasing in the relative market tightness of skilled labor (through the Beveridge curve
relationship between the unemployment rate and labor market tightness), the relative supply of
skilled labor available for employment is also increasing in its relative market tightness.
The intersection of the downward sloping relative demand with the upward sloping relative
supply determines the autarky equilibrium in the unconstrained case as shown in Figure 1. The
unconstrained equilibrium

θs
θl

and t are given by

θs
cl γL
;t =
=
θl
cs (1 − γ)S

µ

γcl
(1 − γ)cs

¶δ µ ¶δ−1
L
S

(22)

The corresponding equilibrium values of ws , wl , θs , and θl are obtained as follows. As mentioned
earlier, when both (9) and (10) are satisfied, firms make zero profits. From the two expressions in
lemma 2, which are derived from the two first-order conditions (9) and (10), we get the following
zero profit condition
1
1−β

µ

cs
q(θs )

¶γ µ

cl
q(θl )

¶1−γ

=1

(23)

The above simply states that to maintain zero profits in equilibrium, an increase in θs must be
associated with a decrease in θl , and vice-versa. This negative relationship between θs , and θl is
plotted in Figure 2 and denoted by ZP C u . Once we know the equilibrium

θs
θl

from (22), we can

determine the equilibrium values of θs , and θl from ZP C u , and the corresponding wi from lemma
2. Denote the unconstrained equilibrium wage and market tightness variables by wlu , wsu , θul , θus .

3.2

Constrained case

The fair-wage constraint in our model arises from social norms about the maximum permissible
wage inequality. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) model fair wage for type-i as a linear combination of
the wage of the other type and the market clearing wage for type-i. Given the search friction and
wage bargaining, there is no market clearing wage in our framework. In principle, we could use the
unconstrained bargained wage in place of the market clearing wage, that is we could use a fair-wage
specification as follows.
wl∗ = τ ws + (1 − τ )wlu
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(24)

where wlu is the unconstrained equilibrium fair wage. Without loss of generality, and to simplify
the exposition considerably, we assume that our fair wage, wl∗ , takes the following simple form
Assumption 3: wl∗ = τ ws
Now, there are two possibilities: either the fair-wage constraint does not bind (wlu > τ wsu ) or it
does bind. Therefore, the expression for the unskilled wage is given by
wl = M ax{wlu , τ wsc }
where wsc is the equilibrium skilled wage in the case where the wage of unskilled workers is constrained to be equal to its fair wage.9
When the fair-wage constraint binds, the constrained relative demand as a function of

θs
θl

is

derived as follows. Re-write (14) and (15) using (16) and (19) as
ws (t) = φβf 0 (t) =

cs
β
1 − β q(θs )

f (t) − tf 0 (t) + t2 ws0 (t) = f (t) − φtf 0 (t) = wl∗ +

(25)
cl
q(θl )

(26)

Dividing (25) by (26) we get
β

cs

φβf 0 (t)
1−β q(θs )
= ∗
cl
0
f (t) − φtf (t)
wl + q(θ
l)

(27)

which upon using the functional form of f (t) yields
td =

cl
q(θl ) )
cs
(1 − γ) q(θ
s)

γ(wl∗ +

(28)

The above is the relative demand for a firm taking wl∗ , θl , and θs as given. Comparing the above
relative demand with the one in the unconstrained case given in (20) note that for any given θl
and θs , the constrained relative demand for skilled labor is higher. This is due to the “strategic
eﬀect” mentioned earlier. Hiring an extra skilled worker lowers the wages of all skilled workers, and
therefore, firms have an incentive to hire more skilled workers than in the unconstrained case. Also,
hiring an additional unskilled worker increases the skilled wage, therefore, firms want to reduce the
hiring of unskilled workers. Both these eﬀects tend to increase the relative demand for skilled
workers in the constrained case.
9

We can also have exactly the same fair-wage constraint for skilled workers in terms of the unskilled wage.

However, as long as the skilled wage is greater than unskilled wage (which is assumed to be true throughout by
choice of parameters), it is obvious that the constraint is never binding for skilled workers.
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If the fair wage wl∗ were exogenous, say a policy determined minimum wage, then we would use
(21) and (28) to determine the equilibrium values of θl , and θs . Using the fair wage specified in
assumption 3, the equation for the relative demand becomes
d

t =

cl
q(θl ) )
cs
(1 − γ) q(θ
s)

γ(τ ws (t) +

(29)

To obtain a simplified expression for relative demand, we use the following lemma which is proved
in the appendix.
Lemma 3: ws (t) =

β
cs
1−β q(θs )

holds even in the constrained case.

The reason that the expression for the skilled wage as function of θs is unchanged from the
expression in lemma 2 for the unconstrained case is the following. Nash bargaining implies that
the skilled wage, ws equals

β
1−β Js ,

where Js is the surplus of the firm from hiring the marginal

skilled worker. Note from (9) and (14) that, for any given market tightness that the firms and
workers take as given, the interaction between a firm and its workers it decides to hire (through its
employment decision and wage bargaining) always results in an outcome in which Js must equal
the recruitment cost of hiring an additional worker,

cs
q(θs ) .

Using lemma 3 to substitute out ws (t) in (29) we get
µ
¶
τβ
cl q(θs )
γ
d
+
t =
(1 − γ) 1 − β cs q(θl )
The relative demand above is decreasing in

θs
θl .

(30)

Comparing (20) and (30) it is easy to see that the

constrained relative demand RLDc in Figure 2 lies to the right of the unconstrained demand RLDu
when the constraint is binding. The relative supply curve, which is an increasing function of
remains unchanged. Therefore, the equilibrium values of

θs
θl

θs
θl ,

and t are higher in the constrained

case (with the constraint binding) compared to the unconstrained case.
To obtain the equilibrium values of θl , θs , and ws in the constrained case, we again make use of
the two first-order conditions (25) and (26) to eliminate t to get our zero profit condition in terms
of θl and θs given by
1
(1 − β)φ

µ

cs
q(θs )

¶γ µµ

τβ
1−β

¶µ

cs
q(θs )

¶

cl
+
q(θl )

¶1−γ

=1

(31)

The above is again a negative relationship between θl , and θs , which yields equilibrium values
of θl , and θs for an equilibrium

θs
θl .

It is shown in the appendix that, in the range of
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θs
θl

for which

the constraint is binding, the curve representing (31) lies to the left of (23) in Figure 2. Intuitively,
for any θl and θs satisfying (23), the introduction of a binding fairness constraint increases the cost
of hiring unskilled labor without aﬀecting the cost of hiring skilled labor. Therefore, firms start
making losses. To restore zero profits, θl must be lower for each θs and vice-versa.
Below we derive the range of

3.3

θs
θl

in which the constraint is binding.

When does the constraint bind?

The constraint binds when wlu < τ wsu . From lemma 2 the constraint binds if
cs
cl
<τ
q(θul )
q(θus )
which upon using q(θ) = kθδ−1 from assumption 2 becomes
µ

θus
θul

¶

>

µ

cl
τ cs

¶

1
1−δ

(32)

Thus, the relative demand curve with the possibility of the fair-wage constraint becomes the one
³ ´ 1
1−δ
,
denoted by RLDc in Figure 1 which has two segments, one for values of θθsl greater than τccls

and the other for values below it which corresponds to the unconstrained relative demand curve.

Given the shape of the relative demand curve with fair-wage constraint, it is possible to get
multiple equilibria. To see this, suppose the relative supply curve is one denoted by RLS 0 in Figure
1. Now, if the society did not have any concern for fairness, then the equilibrium would be at
e3 . However, fairness concerns cause a stepward shift in the relative demand curve making e4 a
candidate for equilibrium as well. That is, both e3 and e4 are possible equilibria when fairness
considerations are present.
The intuition for “multiple equilibria” here is the following. Since the relative cost of labor
(wage plus recruitment cost) is positively related to the relative market tightness, the fair-wage
constraint binds if

θs
θl

is high. If firms expect

θs
θl

to be high and therefore the fair-wage constraint to

bind, they will end up hiring more skilled workers relative to unskilled workers due to the “strategic
eﬀect” discussed earlier. This, in turn, will make the relative market tightness for skilled workers
higher creating a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” Similarly, if

θs
θl

is expected to be low, the fair-wage

constraint is then not expected to bind, the relative demand for skilled labor is lower, which in turn
leads to a low

θs
θl

and thus, an eﬀectively unconstrained outcome.
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As seen from Figure 1, we have multiple possible expectations regarding

θs
θl ,

when relative supply

is in the intermediate range, which happens only when the relative endowment of skilled labor is
in the intermediate range. In other words, if the relative endowment of skilled labor is very high
(low), which the firms know, they will expect the relative market tightness of skilled labor to be
always low (high).
Using (22) which gives the value of unconstrained equilibrium
written as
τ>

µ

cl
cs

¶δ µ

(1 − γ)S
γL

θs
θl ,

the condition (32) can be

¶1−δ

(33)

Therefore, if the condition above is satisfied, the constraint binds, and the equilibrium must be
obtained using the constrained relative demand curve. For example, in the case where cl = cs ,
L = 2S, γ = δ = .5, τ must be greater than .7 for the constraint to bind.
In Figure 2, if

θs
θl

is greater than a threshold value, the fair-wage constraint binds and for such

values the zero profit curve under the binding constraint, ZP C c is to the left of the unconstrained
one, ZP C u .

3.4

Comparing constrained and unconstrained equilibria

Let us compare the autarky equilibrium in the absence of fairness considerations given by point e1
in Figure 1 with the constrained autarky equilibrium given by point e2 . Since the equilibrium

θs
θl

is

higher in the constrained case, Figure 2 implies a lower θl and consequently a higher unemployment
rate of unskilled in the constrained case. Since the impact on θs is ambiguous, the impact on skilled
unemployment and skilled wage is ambiguous. Since the impact on skilled wage is ambiguous, the
impact on unskilled wage is ambiguous as well.
It is shown in the appendix (section 6.6) that in the absence of the “strategic eﬀect”, there is
an increase in skilled unemployment as well. In the absence of the “strategic eﬀect”, a binding
fairness constraint has two eﬀects on the demand for skilled labor. Firstly, since unskilled labor
becomes more expensive, firms substitute skilled labor for unskilled labor. Secondly, given the
complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor, lower employment of unskilled labor reduces
the marginal product of skilled labor and hence reduces the demand for skilled labor. It is shown
that, for an individual firm there is an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor at each

θs
θl

compared to the unconstrained case. However, at the aggregate level, the increased ratio of skilled
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to unskilled employment results in a lower marginal product of skilled labor and consequently a
lower market tightness for skilled labor. Lower market tightness for skilled labor implies lower
skilled wage and higher skilled unemployment. Given that the the ratio of skilled to unskilled
employment is higher, the marginal product of unskilled labor is higher. With a lower recruitment
cost per unskilled worker due to a lower market tightness in the constrained equilibrium, this higher
marginal product implies a higher unskilled wage. The result is summarized below.
Proposition 1: In a constrained equilibrium where wl∗ ≥ wlu , unskilled unemployment is higher
and skilled unemployment (and skilled wage) may be higher or lower compared to an unconstrained
equilibrium. If the “strategic eﬀect” in employment choice is absent (as is the case with a Leontief
production function), then skilled unemployment is higher as well and while skilled wage is lower,
the unskilled wage is higher.
The proposition above highlights the importance of the “strategic eﬀect” in determining the
impact of fair-wage considerations on skilled unemployment. When the constraint is binding, the
possibility of paying a lower wage to skilled workers in the second stage (first stage employment
choice determines marginal product, and hence wage through wage bargaining in the second stage)
induces firms to hire more skilled workers (and fewer unskilled workers) in the first stage which
reduces skilled unemployment (and increases unskilled unemployment). The strength of the “strategic eﬀect” depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production. In the
extreme case of zero elasticity of substitution (Leontief production function) the “strategic eﬀect”
is zero as well (See appendix).

3.5

Comparative statics with respect to τ

Let us assume that the economy is at a constrained equilibrium, i.e., the relative supply curve in
Figure 1 intersects the fair-wage relative demand curve in its upper right-hand downward sloping
part (that lies above the cut-oﬀ value of

θs
θl

at which the fairness constraint binds). An increase

in τ implies a rightward shift in the upper right-hand segment of the relative demand for skilled
labor from (30). Also, from (32), it implies a reduction in the cut-oﬀ value of

θs
θl

at which the

fairness constraint binds. Since the relative supply remains unchanged, an increase in τ increases
the equilibrium values of

θs
θl

and t. Since the corresponding part of the zero-profit curve shifts to

the left in Figure 2 (and the ray through the origin indicating the threshold value of
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θs
θl

rotates

clockwise), there is an unambiguous decrease in θl . An increase in t implies from (25) a decrease in
θs as well. Decreases in ws , θs , and θl imply from (31) (and from our definition of the fair unskilled
wage) that the unskilled wage must rise. Recall that decreases in θs and θl will reduce the cost
of recruiting both types of workers, and since the skilled wage declines, the unskilled wage must
increase to restore the zero profit condition. Therefore, we get the following result.
Proposition 2: Starting from a constrained equilibrium, an increase in the fairness parameter
τ leads to increases in both skilled and unskilled unemployment. Skilled wage falls and unskilled
wage rises.
While a comparison of unconstrained and constrained equilibria yields ambiguous results on the
skilled unemployment as mentioned in proposition 1, proposition 2 shows that any increase in τ ,
starting from a constrained equilibrium, leads to an unambiguous increase in skilled unemployment.
As discussed in proposition 1, in the absence of the “strategic eﬀect”, a move from unconstrained
to constrained equilibrium leads to an increase in skilled unemployment. However, the “strategic
eﬀect” confounds this by providing increased incentive to hire skilled workers. Starting from a
constrained equilibrium, for an incremental increase in τ the “strategic eﬀect” is of the second
order (the eﬀect is present in the initial and final equilibrium, both of which are constrained and
so at least partially get canceled out when looking at the diﬀerence between the two situations),
and hence skilled unemployment increases.

3.6

Change in the relative endowment of skilled labor

It is easy to see from the discussion of autarky equilibrium in the constrained and unconstrained
cases that an increase in the relative endowment of skilled labor rotates the relative supply curve
to the right in Figure 1. This leads to a decrease in the equilibrium
in

θs
θl

θs
θl .

From Figure 2, a decrease

implies a decrease in θs and an increase in θl . Therefore, skilled unemployment increases

and unskilled unemployment decreases in both cases. In the unconstrained case it also leads to a
decrease in wage inequality. Since wage inequality is fixed at

1
τ

in the constrained case, there is no

change in wage inequality as a result of increased relative endowment of skilled labor.
Next, note from (33) that an increase in
Therefore, it is possible that an increase in

S
L

S
L

makes it less likely that the constraint binds.

makes a binding constraint non-binding. This is

shown in Figure 1 when the there is a rightward shift in the relative supply curve from RLS to
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RLS 00 . In this case, there is a decrease in wage inequality because the wage inequality decreases
from

1
τ

to the inverse of the expression on the r.h.s of (33).

To compare the eﬀects of relative endowment changes in the presence and absence of fairness
considerations and to keep the initial equilibrium the same under both situations for a fair comparison, let us consider the reverse case of a reduction in

S
L.

In the presence of fairness considerations,

let us assume that the fair-wage constraint does not bind initially, which gives us the same equilibrium as when there are no fairness considerations at all. The impact on unemployment can be
analyzed using Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, the initial relative supply curve is RLS 00 and therefore,
the intersection with the relative demand curve is in the unconstrained part at e5 , irrespective of
whether we have fairness considerations or not. After the reduction in

S
L

the relative supply curve

moves from RLS 00 to RLS. Now, there is a greater increase in the equilibrium

θs
θl

under fairness

considerations since this reduction now makes the fair-wage condition bind. In Figure 2, the zero
profit curve now is the one corresponding to the constrained case whose relevant portion now lies
to the left of the unconstrained one. Therefore, under fairness considerations, there is a larger
reduction in θl , but the impact on θs becomes ambiguous. In other words, the increase in unskilled unemployment is magnified by the fact that this decrease in the skilled labor force makes
the fair-wage constraint binding.

4

Impact of oﬀshoring

For oﬀshoring to be possible, firms have to be able to fragment their production in such a way
that semi-finished output, whose production only requires the application of unskilled labor, can
be produced in another country (South) and then imported back to be combined with skilled labor
at home to produce the final product. To keep things simple, we assume that one unit of this
semi-finished good is a perfect substitute for a unit of domestic unskilled labor. We assume the
price of imported input inclusive of the search and trade costs as fixed, which is equivalent to a
small country assumption. (This assumption is reasonable if we believe that the South has large
quantities of unskilled labor and that fixed labor productivity in a large subsistence, numeraire
sector there fixes their unskilled wage.) Suppose the unit cost (faced at home) of oﬀshored input
is pm .
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Let the amount of this input imported be denoted by m. As far as the timing of oﬀshoring
is concerned, we assume that the quantity of oﬀshored input is chosen in the first stage along
with skilled labor. This assumption may be closer in spirit to the oﬀshoring of services, while the
assumption of freely adjustable input will be closer to the case of imported intermediate good. Later
we will note the implication of allowing this input to be imported freely at any time.
A firm that decides to oﬀshore and not hire unskilled workers domestically, solves the following
problem:
M axF (s, m) − ws (s, m)s − pm m −
s,m

cs
s
q(θs )

The first order conditions for the above maximization are given by

[F1 (s, m)] − ws − s
F2 (s, m) − s

∂ws
∂s

=

cs
q(θs )

(34)

∂ws
− pm = 0
∂m

(35)

Using Nash bargaining, the wage of skilled is given by the following diﬀerential equation
ws (t) = β[f 0 (t) − tws0 (t)]

(36)

where t equals s/m in the oﬀshoring case. Note from above that the problem of oﬀshoring firms
is similar to that of firms in autarky when the fairness constraint binds. Therefore, the solution
to (36), when f (t) is one given in assumption 1, is ws (t) = φβf 0 (t) where φ ≡
since lemma 3 still holds for oﬀshoring firms: ws (t) = φβf 0 (t) =

β
cs
1−β q(θs ) .

1
1−(1−γ)β .

As well,

For non-oﬀshoring firms,

either lemma 2 or lemma 3 will hold depending on whether the fairness constraint binds or not. In
either case the equilibrium wage of skilled workers is going to equal

β
cs
1−β q(θs ) .

That is, the oﬀshoring

and non-oﬀshoring firms will end up paying the same wage to the skilled workers.
Ruling out the case of fair-wage constraint binding before but not after oﬀshoring (as shown
in the appendix), we discuss three possible cases of oﬀshoring: 1) the fairness constraint does
not bind before and after oﬀshoring; 2) it does not bind before but binds after oﬀshoring; 3) it
binds before and after oﬀshoring. Note that in the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium the issue of fairness
constraint binding or not binding is applicable only for firms that are not oﬀshoring or sourcing
their production input domestically.
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To analyze the impact of oﬀshoring on wage and unemployment we make use of the zero profit
conditions in (23) and (31) which in turn are based on the firms’ optimization exercises in the
unconstrained and constrained cases, respectively. Analogous to the derivation of (31), using the two
first-order conditions (34) and (35), we derive the following zero profit condition for the oﬀshoring
firm
1
(1 − β)φ

µ

cs
q(θs )

¶γ

(pm )1−γ = 1

(37)

We analyze here the diﬀerent possible cases as follows:

4.1

Case 1: Fairness constraint non-binding before and after oﬀshoring

This case also isolates the impact of oﬀshoring on unemployment when unemployment is caused
only by search frictions and there are no fairness considerations, and hence serves as a benchmark
for considering the issues arising out of fairness considerations.
Denote the autarky values of variables with a superscript A and the post-oﬀshoring values with
a superscript o. Recall that the autarky zero profit condition (23) can be written using superscript
A as
1
1−β

µ

cs
q(θA
s)

¶γ µ

cl
q(θA
l )

¶1−γ

=1

(38)

A
At the autarky values of θA
s and θ l , in order for a firm to be induced to oﬀshore, it should make a

positive profit from oﬀshoring. Using (37) we can write this condition as
¶γ
µ
cs
1
(pm )1−γ < 1
(1 − β)φ q(θA
)
s

(39)

Therefore, starting from autarky, in order for any firm to want to oﬀshore, it must be the case that
¶1−γ
µ
cl
p1−γ
m
<
(40)
φ
q(θA
l )
That is, for a given pm , the higher the θA
l , the greater the likelihood of oﬀshoring.
In the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium, the zero profit condition of an oﬀshoring firm derived in (37)
can be written using subscript o as
1
(1 − β)φ

µ

cs
q(θos )

¶γ

(pm )1−γ = 1

while the zero profit condition for a non-oﬀshoring firm is given by
µ
¶γ µ
¶1−γ
cs
1
cl
=1
1 − β q(θos )
q(θol )
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(41)

(42)

Since firms must be indiﬀerent between oﬀshoring and non-oﬀshoring, (41) and (42) imply
µ
¶1−γ
p1−γ
cl
m
=
φ
q(θol )

(43)

Conditions (40) and (43) together imply that θol < θA
l . This implies from lemma 2 that the unskilled
wage falls and the unskilled unemployment rises due to oﬀshoring. By comparing the zero profit
conditions of non-oﬀshoring firms in the pre and post oﬀshoring equilibriums ((38) and (42)) note
o
A
that θol < θA
l implies θ s > θ s , thus, the skilled wage rises, and skilled unemployment falls. There

is a rise in wage inequality as well since the skilled wage rises and the unskilled wage falls.
Note that the cost of hiring a unit of unskilled labor for non-oﬀshoring firms is wlo + q(θclo ) , which
l

from lemma 2 equals

cl
1
1−β q(θol ) .

Therefore, (43) can be re-written as

µ
1−γ
wlo +
=
φ(1
−
β)
p1−γ
m

cl
q(θol )

Since φ(1 − β)1−γ < 1, the above implies that pm < wlo +

¶1−γ

cl
q(θol )

in an oﬀshoring equilibrium. That

is, there is a wedge between the cost of domestic unskilled labor and the price at which the input
is oﬀshored. Since firms are wage setters in the model, they value the marginal worker not only for
her marginal product but also for her impact on the wage bill. An extra unskilled worker lowers
the marginal product of an unskilled worker and therefore, when firms can control the unskilled
wage through employment, the wage of existing unskilled workers goes down. This monopsony
power is valued by firms and to keep this monopsony power, they are willing to bear a higher cost
of domestic unskilled labor compared to the cost of oﬀshoring the production input. Algebraically,
note from (35) that F2 (s, m) = pm − t2 ws0 (t), and since ws0 (t) < 0, the marginal expenditure by a
firm on a unit of oﬀshored input exceeds pm because oﬀshored input increases the marginal product
of domestic skilled labor and hence their wage through Nash bargaining.

4.2

Case 2: Constraint non-binding before and binding after oﬀshoring

Since the fairness constraint is not binding in autarky, starting from autarky, in order for a firm
to oﬀshore, condition (40) must be satisfied. The zero profit condition of oﬀshoring firms is again
given by (41). Since the fairness constraint is binding in the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium, the zero
profit condition of non-oﬀshoring firms, obtained in (31) can be written using superscript o as
µ
¶γ µµ
¶µ
¶
¶1−γ
cs
cs
cl
τβ
1
+
=1
(44)
(1 − β)φ q(θos )
1−β
q(θos )
q(θol )
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Now, (41) and (44) imply pm = wlo +
wlA +

cl
q(θA
l )

> wlo +

cl
q(θol ) .

cl
q(θol )

=

³

τβ
1−β

´³

cs
q(θos )

´

+

cl
q(θol ) .

This along with (40) implies

That is, the cost of hiring unskilled labor is lower in the post-oﬀshoring

equilibrium.
Next, (38), (40), and (41) imply that θos > θA
s , which in turn implies that the post-oﬀshoring
skilled wage is higher and unemployment lower than in autarky: wso > wsA , uos < uA
s.
Since the fair-wage constraint did not bind in autarky, it must be the case that wlA > τ wsA in the
autarky unconstrained equilibrium. Since wso > wsA , the unskilled fair wage in the post-oﬀshoring
equilibrium, τ wso , is higher than τ wsA . Therefore, it is possible for post-oﬀshoring unskilled wage to
be higher than the autarky unskilled wage. However, the post-oﬀshoring unskilled unemployment
must be higher than the autarky unemployment as is shown below.
Lemma 4: When oﬀshoring converts a nonbinding fair-wage constraint into a binding one, it
must be the case that θol < θA
l (Proof in appendix).
To understand the intuition behind this lemma, note first that since the fairness constraint is
binding in the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium, there is no wedge between the cost of domestic unskilled
labor and the cost of oﬀshoring the input: pm = wlo +

cl
q(θol ) .

A binding fairness constraint implies

the absence of monopsony power vis-a-vis unskilled workers, and hence there cannot be a wedge.
Secondly, note that the cost of hiring (wage plus vacancy cost) a unit of unskilled labor under
autarky has to be higher than the cost of oﬀshoring the input for oﬀshoring to actually take
place (This is a necessary condition). Given that in the oﬀshoring equilibrium domestic unskilled
labor and oﬀshored imported input are perfect substitutes, the latter exerts downward competitive
pressure on the domestic unskilled labor market. This downward pressure on unskilled labor market
tightness is further accentuated by the fact that the fair-wage constraint is binding and a higher
wage will have to be paid in comparison to what unskilled workers would have been paid in the
absence of such a constraint.
One of the things that clearly emerges from this analysis is that oﬀshoring makes it more likely
that the fairness constraint will bind. In other words, the cutoﬀ value of τ above which the fairness
constraint binds is lower under oﬀshoring.
Cases 1 and 2 also allow us to compare the eﬀects of oﬀshoring in the absence and presence
of the fair-wage constraint. The autarky equilibria under the two regimes are the same when,
under fairness considerations, the fair-wage constraint is not binding in autarky. Essentially, we are
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comparing the post-oﬀshoring outcomes in cases 1 and 2 above. Note that the zero profit condition
of oﬀshoring firms is given by (41) in both cases, while for non-oﬀshoring firms it is given by (42)
if the constraint does not bind, and (44) if the constraint does bind. Using superscripts u and c
to denote the variables in the unconstrained and constrained cases, respectively, it can be easily
verified from (41), (42), and (44) that (θos )u = (θos )c and (θol )u > (θol )c . The former implies that
skilled wage and unemployment remain unchanged in the oﬀshoring equilibrium if the constraint
binds. However, the unskilled unemployment is higher in the latter case. Finally, the unskilled
wage, given by τ wso , is higher in the constrained case.

4.3

Case 3: Constraint binding before and after oﬀshoring

The results for this case are formally derived in the appendix, but are intuitively explained here as
follows. Since there is a net strategic eﬀect (but no strategic eﬀect to be exercised on unskilled wage
or cost of the imported input) for firms wanting to oﬀshore as well as those wanting to produce the
input domestically (employ domestic unskilled labor), there is no “wedge” between domestic labor
costs (wage plus vacancy costs) and the cost of oﬀshoring the production input. Oﬀshoring here
pushes down the cost of hiring domestic unskilled labor (wage plus vacancy costs). The reason is
that domestic unskilled labor comes in direct competition with the imported input that is a perfect
substitute for it in the oﬀshoring equilibrium. In the oﬀshoring equilibrium, we know that a firm
will be indiﬀerent between oﬀshoring the production input and producing it domestically using
domestic unskilled labor. Given the zero-profit condition of the final good Z, the lower domestic
cost of an unskilled worker allows for a higher labor cost and therefore a higher market tightness
for skilled workers. Thus skilled unemployment is lower and skilled wages are higher. Since the
unskilled wage is proportional to skilled wage by the fair-wage condition, unskilled wages are also
higher. Given that the cost of hiring (wage plus vacancy costs) an unskilled worker has gone down,
this means that the vacancy cost per worker hired has gone down (unskilled labor market tightness
has gone down). Therefore, unskilled unemployment has gone up.
We summarize the result on oﬀshoring in the proposition below.
Proposition 3: Irrespective of the fairness constraint, oﬀshoring leads to an increase in skilled
wage and a decrease in skilled unemployment. As well, there is an unambiguous increase in unskilled
unemployment. If the constraint does not bind before or after oﬀshoring, then the unskilled wage
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decreases unambiguously. If the constraint binds both before and after oﬀshoring, then the unskilled
wage increases unambiguously. Even if the constraint is not binding in autarky, it may become
binding upon oﬀshoring. In this case, the impact on unskilled wage is ambiguous.
Another thing to note from the above analysis is that final unemployment rates and wages of
skilled and unskilled workers in an oﬀshoring equilibrium are independent of the country’s relative
factor endowments and depend totally on the price of the oﬀshored input, pm . On the other hand,
we have shown that autarky unemployment and wages depend on endowments.

4.4

Impact of an increase in τ on oﬀshoring

In this sub-section, we want to study the impact of an increase in τ on the likelihood of oﬀshoring,
and starting from an oﬀshoring equilibrium, the impact of an increase in τ on the extent of oﬀshoring. From proposition 2 we know that in autarky:
notational simplification in this section.
´³
´
³
τβ
cs
+
Notation: Denote ω(τ ) ≡ 1−β
q(θA )
s

dθA
s
dτ

< 0,

dθA
l
dτ

< 0. Let us use the following

cl
q(θA
l )

Using the zero profit condition in autarky when the constraint is binding given by (31) and

proposition 2, we get ω 0 (τ ) > 0. Starting from a constrained autarky equilibrium, in order for firms
to oﬀshore it must be the case that ω(τ ) > pm . Therefore, an increase in τ makes oﬀshoring more
likely.
Starting from an oﬀshoring equilibrium where the fairness constraint is binding, an increase in
τ has no eﬀect on θos as is easily verified from the zero profit condition of oﬀshoring firms given
in (41). Therefore, there is no eﬀect on skilled wage and unemployment. However, unskilled wage
o . Next, the zero profit condition of the non-oﬀshoring firms given in (44)
increases because wlo = τ ws.

implies that

dθol
dτ

< 0. That is, the eﬀect of an increase in τ , starting from an oﬀshoring equilibrium

is to increase unskilled wage and unskilled unemployment. As well, (41) and (44) together imply
´³
´
³
τβ
cl
cs
that 1−β
o
q(θ ) + q(θo ) = pm , and therefore, the relative demand for skilled labor by nons

l

oﬀshoring firms given in (29) is unchanged as is the relative demand s/m for oﬀshoring firms. Since
the eﬀective relative supply of domestic skilled labor has risen due to increased unemployment of
unskilled workers, more firms must be oﬀshoring now. Therefore, an increase in τ leads to an
increase in oﬀshoring.
Proposition 4: An increase in fairness parameter, τ , increases the likelihood of oﬀshoring.
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Starting from an oﬀshoring equilibrium where the fairness constraint is binding, an increase in
τ leads to an increase in oﬀshoring, an increase in unskilled wage, and an increase in unskilled
unemployment, while the unemployment rate and wage of skilled workers remain unchanged.
Before ending the discussion of oﬀshoring we note the implications of allowing the adjustment
of the imported input any time, in particular after the skilled employment has been chosen and
at the same time as (or even after) they bargain over wages with skilled workers. In this case the
optimal choice of imported input must always satisfy F2 (s, m) = pm , and the equilibrium t will be
s
pinned down by this condition. Therefore, the strategic eﬀect will disappear ( ∂w
∂s = 0), and the

first-order condition for the choice of skilled labor will become f 0 (t) − ws (t) =

cs
q(θs ) ,

and the Nash

bargained wage will simply be ws (t) = βf 0 (t). In this case, the cost of employing a unit of oﬀshored
input equals pm . The results regarding the increase in unskilled unemployment and decline in skilled
unemployment obtain even in this case. One diﬀerence from the case when the imported input is
chosen along with the skilled wage in the first stage is that now the wedge between the price of
imported input and the cost of domestic unskilled labor obtains when the fairness constraint binds
in the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium, while earlier it obtained when the fairness constraint did not
bind in the oﬀshoring equilibrium.

5

Discussions and Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have introduced fairness considerations in a model of unemployment with search
frictions. The purpose is to generate positive unemployment rates for both categories of workers as
found in the macroeconomic data across countries and at the same time take the strong evidence
in favor of the fair-wage hypothesis seriously. In our model the fair-wage constraint operated at the
level of the industry. That is, the firm took it as given while deciding on its employment decision
in the first period. In models with competitive labor market such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) or
Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006), when looking at an integrated equilibrium where both types of
labor are employed by all firms, one cannot make a distinction between the cases when the fair-wage
constraint operates at the firm level or the industry level. However, in our framework where firms
have monopsonistic power in the labor market, it is possible to make a distinction between the two
cases. If the fair wage is determined at the firm level, then a firm takes this into account while
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choosing its employment in the first stage. To be more precise, the objective function of the firm
given in (8) now becomes
¾
½
cl
cs
s−
l
M ax F (s, l) − ws (s, l)s − M ax{wl (s, l), τ ws (s, l)}l −
s,l
q(θs )
q(θl )

(45)

where wl∗ has now been replaced by τ ws (s, l) since it is determined within the firm. As a result,
the first order condition for the optimal choice of s in the case where the constraint is expected to
bind is given by
f 0 (t) − ws − s

∂ws
cs
∂ws
− lτ
=
∂s
∂s
q(θs )

(46)

s
Note the extra term lτ ∂w
∂s which captures the fact that any change in skilled wage aﬀects the fair

wage as well, which is taken into account by the firm. Using the Nash bargaining as before, the
wage of the skilled workers is given by the following diﬀerential equation
ws (t) = β[f 0 (t) − (t + τ )ws0 (t)]

(47)

It can be verified that the solution to the above diﬀerential equation is given by
− β1

ws (t) = (t + τ )

Zt

(x + τ )

1−β
β

f 0 (x)dx

(48)

0

Intuitively, since hiring an extra skilled worker reduces the fair wage by lowering the skilled wage,
the value of a skilled worker for a firm is higher than in the case when the fair wage is exogenous
from the firm’s point of view. A higher value of skilled worker implies a higher wage for skilled
workers as well. Therefore, the ‘strategic eﬀect’ in the hiring of skilled workers becomes stronger
than in the case discussed earlier. Note that when the firm takes the fair wage as given, then both in
autarky in the case of oﬀshoring, the only ‘strategic eﬀect’ is that of skilled employment aﬀecting
skilled wage. When the fair wage is determined inside the firm, there is an additional strategic
eﬀect in autarky because skilled employment aﬀects fair wage, however, it vanishes in the case of
oﬀshoring because the firm takes the price of oﬀshored input as given. A full fledged analysis of
the case when the fair wage is determined within the firm is left for future research.
Let us conclude here by summarizing our key findings in this paper. Firstly, we find that the
eﬀect of search frictions and the fair-wage constraint in this encompassing model on the response
of wages, wage inequality and unemployment rates to various shocks is not additively separable.
There are important interaction eﬀects that can be missed unless these two characteristics of the
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labor market are combined in the same model. Specifically, we find that a binding fair-wage
constraint increases the unskilled unemployment rate and can also lead to an increase in the skilled
unemployment rate as compared to an equilibrium where fairness considerations are absent or
non-binding. This is consistent with the experiences of Europe and the US.
Secondly, allowing for oﬀshoring of unskilled jobs in our model, we find that it becomes more
likely that the fair-wage constraint binds. Oﬀshoring always leads to an increase in skilled wage,
a decrease in skilled unemployment and an increase in unskilled unemployment. The presence of
fairness considerations increases the adverse impact of oﬀshoring on unskilled unemployment. The
unskilled wage can increase or decrease as a result of oﬀshoring. If the fair-wage constraint binds
both before and after oﬀshoring, then the unskilled wage increases unambiguously.
Finally, the diﬀerence between our combined model and that of a model purely based on fairness
considerations is also important to note. It is shown in the appendix (section 6.11) that in a pure
fair-wage model there is no skilled unemployment. As a result, skilled unemployment is not aﬀected
by shocks such as changes in the degree of fairness, changes in the relative factor endowments, or
oﬀshoring. More importantly, while in the hybrid (search plus fair wage) model presented in
the text the adjustment to any shock takes place through changes in both skilled and unskilled
unemployment, in the fair-wage model only the unskilled unemployment adjusts which can result
in extremely high levels of unskilled unemployment. For example, we show in the appendix that in
the fair-wage model oﬀshoring leads to complete unemployment of unskilled workers.
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Appendix

6.1

Firms never pay a wage less than the fair wage

Given the production function in (1) a firm maximizes

where bi = εi i, w
bi =

wi
εi ,

cbl b
cbs
sb −
l
s, b
l) − w
bs sb − w
blb
l−
M axF (b
q(θs )
q(θl )
se,e
l

, i = s, l. Here

cei
q(θi )

is the recruitment cost per eﬃciency unit of labor , and

θi is the market tightness in terms of eﬃciency units of labor. cbi is clearly decreasing in the number
of eﬃciency units per worker if the recruitment cost per worker (irrespective of the eﬃciency units

provided) is constant (for given θs , θl ).
We show below that paying an unskilled worker a wage equal to wl∗ leaves the profits gross
of recruitment costs unchanged relative to what is obtained under a lower wage, for given total
number of eﬃciency units of labor, b
l = εl l, where l is the number of workers. If wl ≤ wl∗ , then
εl =

wl
wl∗

≤ 1. Therefore, the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor, w
bl =

wl
εl

= wl∗ , which is taken as

given by the firm. Thus, as long as the firm pays a wage of wl∗ per eﬃciency unit of labor and hires
a fixed total of b
l eﬃciency units of labor, its profit gross of recruitment costs remains unchanged.

The profits net of recruitment costs will be higher at per worker wage wl∗ than any lower wage for

the following reason. Paying a per-worker wage of wl∗ would result in each worker working at full
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eﬃciency. Therefore, fewer workers will be needed to provide a given number of eﬃciency units, b
l.

Given that recruitment cost per worker is constant for given θs , θl , profits net of recruitment costs
will be higher.
Even if the recruitment cost per eﬃciency unit is not declining in the eﬃciency units per worker,
the profits will not decline and will remain unchanged. As in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we assume
that firms have a preference for fairness if the fair wage can be provided at no cost to their profits.
Thus, firms never pay less than the fair wage.

6.2

Proof of Lemma 1

Re-write (12) and (13) as
ws (t) = β[f 0 (t) − tws0 (t) − wl0 (t)]

(49)

wl (t) = β[f (t) − tf 0 (t) + t2 ws0 (t) + twl0 (t)]

(50)

The above is a system of diﬀerential equations in the argument t. We guess the following solution:
ws (t) = βf 0 (t); wl (t) = β(f (t) − tf 0 (t)), and verify that it satisfies (49)-(50).
The guessed solution implies
00

ws0 (t) = βf (t); wl0 (t) = β[−tf 00 (t)]

(51)

Therefore, tws0 (t)+wl0 (t) = 0, and hence (49)-(50) imply ws (t) = βf 0 (t); wl (t) = β(f (t)−tf 0 (t)).QED

6.3

Proof of Lemma 2

The first-order conditions in (9) and (10) can be written as

f 0 (t) − ws (t) − tws0 (t) − wl0 (t) =
f (t) − tf 0 (t) − wl (t) + t2 ws0 (t) + twl0 (t) =
0

cs
q(θs )
cl
q(θl )

Using tws0 (t) + wl0 (t) = 0, and ws (t) = βf (t) from lemma 1 in (52) we get
ws (t) =
Similarly, wl (t) =

cs
β
1 − β q(θs )

β
cl
1−β q(θl ) .QED.
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(52)
(53)

6.4

Proof of Lemma 3
0

Proof. Note that ws = φβf (t). The first-order condition with respect to s given in (14) can be
re-written as
0

f (t) − ws (t) − tws0 (t) =

cs
q(θs )

The wage determination equation is
ws (t) = β[f 0 (t) − tws0 (t)]
The above two imply that
ws (t) =

cs
β
1 − β q(θs )

QED.

6.5

Constrained ZP C c lies to the left of the unconstrained ZP C u in
(θl , θs ) space

Proof: Recall from the text that the two zero profit conditions are
µ
¶γ µ
¶1−γ
1
cs
cl
= 1
1 − β q(θs )
q(θl )
µ
¶γ µ µ
¶µ
¶
¶1−γ
1
cs
cs
cl
β
+
= 1
τ
(1 − β)φ q(θs )
1−β
q(θs )
q(θl )
Now, for the unconstrained case, obtain θs and θl corresponding to any

θs
θl

(54)
(55)

from (54). Next, verify

that at this θs and θl the l.h.s. of (55) is greater than 1. To see this divide (55) by (54) to obtain
¶µ
¶
¶1−γ
µ µ
cs q(θl )
β
φ
+1
τ
1−β
cl q(θs )
´ ³
´
³
cl
cs
>
Now, if the constraint binds, then τ q(θ
q(θl ) , and therefore,
s)
−1

−1

φ

µ µ
µµ
¶µ
¶
¶1−γ
¶
¶1−γ
β
β
cs q(θl )
−1
>φ
= φ−1 (1 − β)γ−1 > 1
τ
+1
+1
1−β
cl q(θs )
1−β

where the last inequality is true for any 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1.
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(56)

6.6

Constrained skilled unemployment higher in the absence of
strategic eﬀect

Proof: Note that the absence of strategic eﬀect in wage setting in the constrained case implies
∂ws
∂s

= 0. Therefore, the solution to (16) is simply ws (t) = βf 0 (t). The two first-order condition

become
cs
(1 − β)q(θs )
cl
0
f (t) − tf (t) = wl∗ +
q(θl )
f 0 (t) =

Therefore, the relative demand for skilled labor is given by
cs

1

f 0 (t)
1−β q(θs )
= ∗
cl
0
f (t) − tf (t)
wl + q(θ
l)
The above can be re-written as
d

t =
Using wl∗ = τ ws (t) =

τ βcs
(1−β)q(θs ) ,

γ(1 − β)(wl∗ +

cl
q(θl ) )

(57)

cs
(1 − γ) q(θ
s)

the above becomes

µ
¶
cl q(θs )
γ
τ β + (1 − β)
t =
(1 − γ)
cs q(θl )
d

In the constrained case, when (33) is satisfied, the constrained relative demand above lies to the
³
´
³ ´ 1
1−δ
cl q(θs )
γ
cl
θs
right of the unconstrained one, given by td = (1−γ)
,
for
values
of
>
where
θl
τ cs
cs q(θl )

the fair-wage constraint binds. This is simply because unskilled labor is more expensive due to
its higher wage, and hence firms economize on unskilled labor. Since the relative supply curve is
unchanged, the constrained equilibrium

θs
θl

(when the fair-wage constraint binds) is higher than the

unconstrained one even in the absence of the strategic eﬀect.
To find the equilibrium values of θs and θl corresponding to the equilibrium
the two first-order conditions to obtain
¶γ µ
¶γ µµ
¶µ
¶
¶1−γ
µ
cs
τβ
cs
1
cl
=1
+
1−β
q(θs )
1−β
q(θs )
q(θl )

θs
θl ,

eliminate t from

(58)

Again, it can be verified that the curve representing (58) above lies to the left of the unconstrained
one in (54) in (θl , θs ) space for values of (θl , θs ) for which the fairness constraint binds. Therefore,
the constrained equilibrium θl is still lower than the unconstrained one. Note that the skilled wage
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is given by ws (t) = βf 0 (t) in both the unconstrained and constrained cases. We have already
established that the equilibrium t is higher in the constrained case. This immediately implies
that ws (t) is lower. Since ws (t) is increasing in θs , (ws (t) =
Also, since f (t) − tf 0 (t) = wl∗ +

cl
q(θl )

βcs
(1−β)q(θs ) ),

θs must decrease as well.

in the constrained case and f (t) − tf 0 (t) = wl +

cl
q(θl )

in the

unconstrained case, and given that we have shown that θl is lower in the constrained case, with a
higher t in the constrained case (that leads to a higher f (t) − tf 0 (t)), unskilled wage is higher in
the constrained case. Q.E.D

6.7

Leontief Case

The production function is Leontief, but matching functions remain Cobb-Douglas as above.
Wage determination
F (s, l) = min(ϕs, l). In this case when ϕs > l, M P L = ∞ and M P S = 0, while if ϕs < l,
we have M P L = 0 and M P S = ∞.

To have a well-defined bargaining problem in the second

stage, our bargaining set should be bounded and therefore, we assume that there is an upper bound
(constant) on skilled and unskilled wages, given by ws and wl that can be paid. It is easy to see
that the following will be a bargaining solution that satisfies the Stole-Zweibel intrafirm bargaining
conditions:
Unconstrained case: When ϕs > l, wl = wl and ws = 0, while if ϕs < l, we have wl = 0 and
ws = ws .
Constrained case: wl = wl∗ . When ϕs > l, ws = 0, while if ϕs < l, we have ws = ws .
Equilibrium
When faced with these wage functions, the firm will always set ϕs = l in the first stage. In
other words,

s
l

is always set to

1
ϕ.

Thus, the strategic eﬀect is completely absent in the Leontief case.

6.8

Ruling out the case of fair-wage constraint binding before but not after
oﬀshoring

From the analysis done in Case 1 in the text, it is clear that in the absence of any fair-wage
considerations (equivalent to the case where the fairness constraint never binds), the relative wage
³ o ´u ³ A ´u
s
s
> w
where superscript u denotes the unconstrained case. Now
goes up after oﬀshoring: w
wo
wA
l

l
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if the fairness constraint is binding in autarky, then

³

wsA
wlA

´u

> τ1 , and therefore,

³

wso
wlo

´u

> τ1 , that

is, the constraint must bind in the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium. Therefore, this case can be ruled
out as a possibility.

6.9

Proof of Lemma 4.

Proof: Suppose not. Suppose θol > θA
l . This implies that the unconstrained unskilled wage correelo is greater than wlA . Since the constrained unskilled wage wlo > w
elo
sponding to θol , denoted by w
by definition, wlo > wlA , and hence, wlA +

6.10

cl
q(θA
l )

< wlo +

cl
q(θol ) ,

which is a contradiction.Q.E.D.

Derivation of results for case 3 under oﬀshoring: Fairness constraint binding before and after oﬀshoring

If the fairness constraint binds in autarky, the zero profit condition is
¶γ µµ
¶
¶1−γ
µ
¶µ
1
τβ
cs
cs
cl
+
=1
(1 − β)φ q(θA
1−β
q(θA
q(θA
s)
s)
l )

(59)

Given the zero profit condition of oﬀshoring firms in (41), starting from autarky equilibrium, in
order for oﬀshoring to be profitable, it must be the case that
¶
¶µ
µ
cs
τβ
cl
+
> pm
A
1−β
q(θs )
q(θA
l )

(60)

In the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium the zero profit condition of the oﬀshoring firms is given by (41),
while that of non-oﬀshoring firms is given by (44). The two together imply that
µ
¶µ
¶
τβ
cs
cl
cl
o
+
pm = wl +
o =
o
q(θl )
1−β
q(θs )
q(θol )
This immediately implies from (60) that
¶
µ
¶µ
¶
µ
¶µ
cl
τβ
cs
cl
τβ
cs
+
+
o
o <
A
1−β
q(θs )
q(θl )
1−β
q(θs )
q(θA
l )

(61)

(62)

o
A
Next, (44) and (59) imply that θos > θA
s , and consequently, ws > wl . Therefore, skilled wage

increases and skilled unemployment decreases compared to autarky. Since the fairness constraint
binds, unskilled wage, wlo = τ wso > wlA = τ wsA . Since the unskilled wage increases while the
unskilled labor cost decreases as shown in (62), θl must decrease. Therefore, both unskilled wage
and unskilled unemployment increase unambiguously.
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6.11

Outcomes in the standard fair-wage model

The firm’s maximization problem can be written as:
M ax
s,l

sγ l1−γ
− ws s − M ax{wl , wl∗ }l − cs s − cl l
γ γ (1 − γ)1−γ

(63)

where ci is a constant recruitment cost per worker of type i = s, l. Since there is no search for
workers, recruitment cost does not depend on market tightness in this case (Every vacancy posted
is filled with probability, q = 1).
6.11.1

Fair-wage constraint does not bind (same as the unconstrained case) under
autarky

Assuming that firms decide on employment given market wages, the first-order conditions of the
firm’s maximization problem are:
¤−1 γ−1 1−γ
£ γ
γs l
= ws + cs ;
γ (1 − γ)1−γ

£ γ
¤−1
γ (1 − γ)1−γ
(1 − γ)sγ l−γ = wl + cl

(64)

Dividing one first-order condition by the other we can solve for relative labor demand as follows:
∙
¸
γ
wl + cl
s
=
l
1 − γ ws + cs

(65)

The two first order conditions, with some manipulation, give us the zero profit condition as
follows:

(ws + cs )γ (wl + cl )1−γ = 1
The relative factor demand equals relative factor supply, which is written as
∙
∙
¸
¸
S
γ
wl + cl
wl + cl
s
S
1−γS
= ⇒
.
= ⇒
=
l
L
1 − γ ws + cs
L
ws + cs
γ L

(66)

(67)

Plugging this into our zero profit condition, we can get our unconstrained solutions as wsu =
´γ−1
´γ
³
³
1−γ S
1−γ S
S
u =
−
c
and
w
− cl . Thus, wsu is decreasing in L
and wlu is increasing in
s
l
γ L
γ L

it. Wages of skilled and unskilled labor are inversely related to their respective recruitment costs.
There is no unemployment.
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6.11.2

Fair-wage constraint is binding (constrained equilibrium), under autarky

We will have similar first-order conditions as in unconstrained (or non-binding) case. Only wl gets
replaced by the fair-wage wl∗ . Dividing one first-order condition by the other and rearranging terms
and plugging our original fair-wage relation wl∗ = τ ws , we can get the labor demand as
∙
¸
s
γ
τ ws + cl
=
l
1 − γ ws + cs

(68)

The zero-profit condition can be written as
(ws + cs )γ (τ ws + cl )1−γ = 1

(69)

For given τ , the zero-profit condition above solves for the constrained equilibrium skilled wage wsc .
Since the left-hand side of the zero-profit condition is increasing in both ws and τ , it is clear that
wsc is decreasing in τ , and if that is so the constrained unskilled wage τ wsc is increasing in τ (to keep
h c i
τ ws +cl
γ
is increasing in
the left-hand side equal to unity). Thus, relative labor demand, sl = 1−γ
wc +cs
s

τ since the numerator is increasing and the denominator is decreasing in τ . Skilled labor here is
h c i
τ ws +cl
γ
S
fully employed since their wages are fully flexible. Therefore, we have sl = 1−γ
wc +cs = L(1−ul )
s

where ul is the unemployment rate of unskilled labor. Since the equilibrium relative labor demand,
h c i
τ ws +cl
γ
goes up as a result of an increase in τ , (1 − ul ) has to go down,i.e., ul has to go up.
1−γ wc +cs
s

Skilled unemployment will always be zero. Note that equilibrium skilled wage and hence equilibrium
relative demand do not depend on the economy’s labor endowments. Thus, an increase in S or a
reduction in L will require a reduction in ul for sl =

S
L(1−ul )

to hold (as skilled labor will always be

fully employed).
When does the fair-wage constraint bind? From the above, we can also see that the fairwage constraint will bind when τ wsu > wlu . This, from the expressions for unconstrained wages, can
be written as
τ

"µ

1−γS
γ L

¶γ−1

#

− cs >

The right-hand side of this inequality is increasing in

µ

1−γS
γ L

S
L

¶γ

− cl

and the left-hand side is decreasing in it

but increasing in τ . Thus, the likelihood that the constraint binds decreases with
with τ .
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(70)

S
L

and increases

As we move from an unconstrained to a constrained equilibrium due to an increase in τ , skilled
unemployment remains at zero, unskilled unemployment increases from zero to a positive value,
skilled wages fall and the unskilled wage rises because
6.11.3

s
l

increases.

Oﬀshoring in the pure fair-wage model

Finally, we can look at the case of oﬀshoring. In an oﬀshoring equilibrium, the following equation
(zero-profit condition) will hold for firms that oﬀshore:

(wso + cs )γ p1−γ
m =1

(71)

where superscript o stands for oﬀshoring. This fixes ws in the oﬀshoring equilibrium. Oﬀshoring
will take place only if wlA + cl > pm , where superscript A stands for autarky. Clearly in that case
ws will go up after oﬀshoring. Starting from a constrained autarky equilibrium, can we have an
oﬀshoring equilibrium where some firms oﬀshore and others hire domestic unskilled workers? For
the latter firms, the zero profit condition will be
(wso + cs )γ (wlo + cl )1−γ = 1

(72)

Therefore, pm = wlo + cl . If the fair-wage constraint is binding in autarky, then the unskilled wage
is τ wsA , and hence τ wsA + cl > pm = wlo + cl . That is, τ wsA > wlo . We also know that wso > wsA .
Therefore, wlo < τ wso .
Thus, unskilled workers can be hired in an oﬀshoring equilibrium only if their wage, wlo , is less
than the fair wage, τ wso . However, at a wage less than the fair wage, unskilled do not put in full
eﬀort, and therefore, firms do not hire them. In other words, the unskilled unemployment rate will
be 100%. Oﬀshoring leads to a huge increase in unemployment.
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